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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that the defendant have had the strategic advantages of a full
hearing in an adversarial context. If it is reasonable to conclude
as a practical matter that the defendant would have contended
an issue in the first action more vigorously and perhaps more
successfully had its importance been. comparable to that of the
same issue in the second action, the court should not allow col-
lateral use of the first judgment. Similarly, it is submitted that
the courts should hesitate to give estoppel effect to a prior
judgment from which the defendant chose not to prosecute an
appeal where such failure might reasonably have been predi-
cated upon economic or other practical considerations. In any
event collateral estoppel effect should not be given to default or
consent judgments since they are not susceptible to a thorough
analysis of which issues were necessarily decided, and the de-
fendant has probably not litigated with full vigor.
Under the facts of DeWitt, the requirement of mutuality
would be productive only of additional and unnecessary litiga-
tion. Where a person has had the opportunity and the incentive
to litigate and has done so, and where the issues presented are
identical with those of the former action, the assertion of the
former judgment as collateral estoppel should be allowed. It
should be recognized, however, that abandonment of mutuality
may well increase the scope and furor, as well as the number of
lawsuits. More importantly, by substituting the test of "full
vigor" for the requirement of mutuality the court has increased
both the frequency and difficulty of determinations of whether
collateral estoppel is proper. Due to the apparent impracticability
of any detailed test for either identity of issues or full vigor, and
the fundamental unfairness which would result from an im-
proper determination of either, the courts should proceed with
caution in allowing the affirmative use of a prior judgment by
a nonparty.
Taxation: Federal Courts Not Bound by State Trial
Court's Determination of Taxpayer's Property Interest
The executor of decedent's estate claimed a marital deduction
for the value of a trust, asserting that the surviving spouse pos-
sessed a general power of appointment over the corpus." The
1. In order for the trust to qualify for the marital deduction the
surviving spouse must possess a general power of appointment over
that portion of the trust from which she receives income. INT. REv.
CoDE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
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Commissioner disallowed the claim on the ground that a release2
of the power executed prior to decedent's death was effective.
While the action was pending in the Tax Court, a proceeding to
determine the validity of the purported release was initiated in
a state court. The state court held that the release of a contin-
gent power was void and therefore decedent's wife retained her
general power of appointment.3 The Tax Court accepted the
holding as an authoritative exposition of state law and allowed
the deduction.
4
In a second case,5 the executor of an estate had applied the
state proration statute" permitting the use of the marital deduc-
tion to determine the taxable estate. The application of the
statute substantially reduced the size of the taxable estate, and
was disallowed by the Commissioner. The executor sought a
determination from a state court as to whether the proration
statute should be applied.7 The court held that state law re-
quired the application of the proration statute to decedent's es-
tate.8 On appeal, the state property decision was denied binding
effect.0
2. Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1966).
3. Matter of Irving Trust Co., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1963. Of the
twenty-two interested parties notified, only three filed briefs, all ar-
guing the release to be void.
4. Estate of Herman Bosch, 43 T.C. 120 (1964), affd sub nom.
Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966). The Tax Court
reasoned that (1) the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties and
its judgment was conclusive as to them; (2) the New York Supreme
Court's decisions are precedent throughout the state; (3) the Commis-
sioner had notice of the state proceedings; (4) the state, court
reached a reasoned and deliberate conclusion.
5. Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965).
6. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-401 (a) (1960). The statute pro-
vides that both state and federal death taxes shall be equitably
distributed among the persons interested in the estate unless the testa-
tor directs otherwise. However, in making this proration among the
interested persons, any exemptions granted by the Act imposing the
tax will be allowed first in order to determine the size of the taxable
estate.
7. Notice was given to all interested parties, including the Com-
missioner, but only the guardian ad litem of decedent's grandchildren,
who assented to the application of the statute, appeared at the pro-
ceedings. For administrative and procedural reasons the Commis-
sioner has found it impossible to appear at all state proceedings which
may have an impact on future taxation assessment.
8. The state court held that the proration statute applied unless
there were a clear and unambiguous directive to the contrary. In
reviewing decedent's will the court could find no such directive. The
decision was affirmed in Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 222 F.
Supp. 446 (D. Conn. 1963).




The Supreme Court joined the cases because of the common
issue and held"0 that where a federal estate tax is imposed on a
state defined property interest, the state trial court's determina-
tion of that interest is not binding on federal authorities. Com-
missioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
Subject to several exceptions," the federal estate tax is im-
posed on property interests as defined by the common law of the
individual states.'2 However, the federal courts have been in
conflict as to whether the determination of a taxpayer's property
interests by a lower state court is an authoritative declaration
of state law binding on federal tax authorities. 3
The Supreme Court first considered the question in Freuler
v. Helvering,14 in which it held a state probate court decree
ordering an income beneficiary of a trust to repay an improperly
distributed share of the trust earnings conclusive on a federal
court for purposes of tax assessment. In so holding the Court
10. Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Fortas dissenting.
11. See Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955); Braver-
man & Gerson, The Conclusiveness of State Court Decrees in Federal
Tax Litigation, 17 TAx L. REV. 545 (1962). Braverman and Gerson
outline three categories in which state court decrees enter into federal
taxation litigation: (1) a state decision on an issue ancillary to the
tax question but not involving a determination of the taxpayer's prop-
erty interest upon which the federal tax is imposed; (2) a decree ren-
dered in an area where the federal tax statute has established the cri-
terion of taxation; (3) a state decree determining the taxpayer's prop-
erty interests on which the federal tax is to be imposed. The first two
types of state court decrees have no effect upon a federal court in a
subsequent proceeding; the scope of this Comment is limited to the
third type.
12. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
13. See, e.g., Pierpont's Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965); Faulkerson's Estate v.
United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887 (1962).
Compare Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955), with
Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964).
Nor are the commentators in agreement as to a reasonable solu-
tion. J. MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL G=T AND ESTATE TAxATION
§§ 10.10-.23 (1959); 1 R. PAUL, FEDERmA EsTATE AND GI=r TAXATION
§ 1.11 (1942); Braverman & Gerson, supra note 11, at 545; Cardozo,
Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions,
51 YALE L.J. 783 (1942); Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State
Court's Decision in a Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAx L.
REV. 213 (1957); Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of State
Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 CAi.r. L. REv. 638 (1953); Stephens
& Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal
Tax Controversies, 46 Mn.m L. REV. 223 (1961). The implications of
the demands of the expanding federal fisc upon federalism are dis-
cussed in Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799
(1942).
14. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
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denied the Commissioner's contention that the state proceeding
was collusive' 5 and, therefore, not a valid declaration of state
law binding on the federal court. The decision has been cited
for establishing the principle that unless a state proceeding is
found to be collusive, it is binding on federal authorities. The
Freuler approach was affirmed in Blair v. Commissioner,6 in
which the Commissioner attacked the finding of an intermediate
state appellate court that the petitioner had validly assigned his
right to trust income to his sons. The Supreme Court held the
state court's determination to be conclusive on federal author-
ities, denying without extensive comment that the state proceed-
ings were collusive.
17
Although Freuler and Blair established a "collusive-noncol-
lusive" test for determining the effect to be given a lower state
court's determination of the property rights upon which federal
taxation turns, neither case set forth viable standards for the
application of that test. The result has been a great deal of
inconsistency among the courts' s as to which factors will be
considered as evidence of collusion in the state proceedings 9 and
15. The Commissioner argued that the state court proceeding was
collusive in the sense that the parties had joined to obtain a decision
adverse to him.
We cannot so hold .... Notice was given to the interested
parties. Objections to the account were presented, and the
matter came on for hearing in due course, all parties being
represented by counsel. The decree purports to decide issues
regularly submitted and not to be in any sense a consent de-
cree. The court ruled against the remaindermen on one point,
and in their favor on another..
291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934). It should be noted that the Court's definition
of collusive is in no way limited to fraudulent conduct by the tax-
payer.
16. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
17. The Court in answering the Commissioner's argument that the
suit was collusive recalled that the state appellate court had reviewed
the lower court's decision and had reached a deliberate conclusion.
18. For a complete discussion of the federal courts' approaches to
the problem, see Braverman & Gerson, supra note 11.
19. E.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (whether the
state decree was a consent decree); Stallworth's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958) (the time at which the state pro-
ceeding was initiated); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401
(10th Cir. 1956), aff'g 24 T.C. 488 (1955) (the language of the decision);
Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) (whether there was
actual fraud); Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952)
(whether the state proceeding was adversary); Kelly's Trust v. Com-
missioner, 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948) (whether an appeal was taken);
Commissioner v. Masterson, 127 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1942) (whether the
Commissioner was notified); Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957)
(the deliberate nature of the court's conduct). Whether each of these
factors is itself a vital consideration or merely evidence of the adver-
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the relative weight to be given such evidence. The factor most
frequently considered is the adversary nature of the state court
proceedings. A majority of the courts have deemed a finding
that the state court decision was rendered in an adversary pro-
ceeding determinative of the question of collusion,20 on the
theory that this characteristic insures that the state decision is
an accurate declaration of state law. A minority of the courts,
however, have refused to consider the adversary character of the
state proceeding conclusive evidence, apparently because of a
notion that a strict adversary requirement may invalidate many
otherwise valid decrees.21 The showing of actual fraud in these
state proceedings is apparently necessary in order to establish
collusiveness.22  The Tax Court has ostensibly adhered to the
adversary requirement 23 as the criterion for determining collu-
siveness, distinguishing on very narrow grounds adverse decisions
from the minority circuits.24 However, the problem is obviated
by the decision of the Supreme Court in the instant case denying
conclusive effect to all such lower state court determinations
sary character of the proceeding is arguable. See Comment, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1007 (1966).
20. See, e.g., Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966); Pierpont's Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d
277 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965); Faulkerson's
Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887
(1962); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956);
Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 228 F.2d 772 (1st Cir.
1956); Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955).
21. See, e.g., Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1964); Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963);
Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
22. E.g., Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th
Cir. 1963).
23. See, e.g., Estate of William Landers, 38 T.C. 828 (1962); Estate
of Isaac Darlington, 36 T.C. 599 (1961); Estate of Howard Stevens, 36
T.C. 184 (1961).
24. Estate of Charles Eson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957). The adversary
requirement has not been uniformly indorsed by the commentators.
See Braverman & Gerson, supra note 11 (the state proceeding must be
adversary with numerous factors considered as evidence of this qual-
ity); Cardozo, supra note 13 (state court decisions should be given
only their proper weight as precedent from which the federal court may
make an independent examination of state law); Stephens & Free-
land, supra note 13 (district court judges should be seated as nonvoting
advisors on the Tax Court as to matters of local law, along with a
procedural technique permitting certification of a question of state law
to the highest state court); Note, Effect of State Court Decrees in
Federal Tax Litigation, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 569 (1963) (unless the Com-
missioner's position is advocated at the state proceeding the federal




and rejecting the collusive-noncollusive analysis which had de-
veloped from Freuler and Blair.
2 5
The Court developed three separate lines of reasoning to sup-
port its holding. First, citing Freuler, it denied that the Com-
missioner was bound by either res judicata or collateral estoppel
since, in neither case, was he a party to the state action.26 Sec-
ond, the Court relied on legislative history and the statutory
language to argue that the marital deduction should be narrowly
construed, 27 and that Congress, having foreseen the instant prob-
lem, intended a state court's determination to be afforded only
proper regard, not conclusiveness. 28 From these premises, it rea-
soned that the legislative intent to protect the federal fisc from
taxpayers who obtain favorable, but perhaps inaccurate, deter-
minations of state law from state trial courts can best be imple-
mented by denying conclusive effect to those state trial court
decrees.
The third, and critical rationale was based on an analogy with
the effect to be given a state trial court's interpretation of state
law in diversity cases. Under the Erie2 rule, a federal court
sitting in a diversity case is bound by a declaration of state law
25. It is disconcerting that the Court distinguishes Blair on the
ground that it was an appellate court decision, while Freuler, a case
which seems to also involve a state trial court proceeding, is cited as
authority only on a collateral point.
26. However, the Commissioner had received notice of both ac-
tions. See notes 4 & 7 supra.
27. This appears to be consistent with the general rule. See
Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964). However, three weeks
prior to the instant decision, the Court, in Northeastern Penn. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213 (1967), argued that
the marital deduction should be broadly construed in holding that it
was not necessary for the widow's share of trust income to be ex-
pressed in a fraction or percentage to satisfy the specific portion re-
quirement of the statute. Furthermore, the Court supports its decision
with considerations unique to the marital deduction, yet articulates a
rule of tax law to be applied beyond this provision.
28. "[PJroper regard should be given to interpretations of the will
rendered by a court in a bona fide adversary proceeding." S. REP. No.
1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 4 (1948).
The Court's reading of the legislative history is debatable. It
has been argued that if the legislative history supports any conclusion,
it reveals an intent that bona fide adversary state proceedings are con-
clusive on the federal authorities. In dissent, Justice Harlan points out
that the Report is at best equivocal and that, from the language of
the Report, it may also be argued that "proper regard" means con-
clusive if the state proceeding is noncollusive and adversary. 387
U.S. at 475 n.3; see Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966).
29. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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only from the state's highest court. Since the underlying sub-
stantive rule involved is based on state law in both diversity
and federal tax cases, the Court maintained that the same rules
for determining state law ought to apply. Hence lower state court
decisions are not controlling as to state law when the state's high-
est court has not spoken.30
The Court's holding eliminates the difficulty of articulating
the collusive-noncollusive test or otherwise defining and ap-
plying a formal test to each state decision to determine whether
it truly reflects the law of the state.31 More importantly,
however, by permitting the federal court to weigh the trial
court's declaration of state law against that of the state's
highest court,32 the substance of the trial court's decision
is evaluated, rather than the form of the proceeding which may
or may not reflect the accuracy of the substantive decision. In
addition, the decision affords the maximum amount of protection
to the federal fisc 33 by providing the Commissioner an opportun-
ity to litigate the substantive issue.
There are, however, alternative methods for protecting the
federal fisc less drastic than that adopted by the Court. Rather
than deny conclusive effect to all lower state court proceedings,
it would seem more desirable to utilize the traditional collusive-
noncollusive test to deny effect to only those proceedings which
were likely to give rise to inaccurate declarations.34 While it is
true that a degree of uncertainty was involved in the former
30. See King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S.
153 (1948).
31. In addition, a formal test of collusiveness may be used as a
cloak for permitting the courts to look to the accuracy of the decision,
and then, depending on its approval or disapproval, labeling it collu-
sive or noncollusive.
32. There is undoubtedly a rational connection between the qual-
ity of the decision and the level of the court. This follows from the
competence of the high court judges, the number of judges hearing and
deciding a question, the mechanical aids available to the high courts,
and the fact that the opinion once made is published.
33. This consideration becomes particularly germane if it is as-
sumed that the primary conflict in a distribution of property in the
state court is between the Commissioner and the potential distributees.
See Note, Effect of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation, 30
U. C~i. L. REv. 569 (1963).
34. This approach is advocated by the dissent, a number of com-
mentators and courts, and counsel for the government. In addition to
its desire to protect the federal fisc, the majority's apparent reason for
ignoring this authority is that the uncertainty incidental to defining a
"collusive" suit is dispelled. 387 U.S. at 463; see also J. MERTENS,
supra note 11; R. PAuL, supra note 11; Braverman & Gerson, supra
note 11; Caln, supra note 11; cases cited note 20 supra.
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approach, some of this uncertainty could have been eliminated
by a definitive explanation of whether nonadversariness was the
essential element of collusion.35 Moreover, it is arguable that
while the holding may eliminate the uncertainty of the prior
test, it introduces uncertainty in tax planning by requiring local
attorneys to predict what the determination of local law by a
foreign court will be.36
Furthermore, there may be a genuine hardship to the tax-
payer since the state proceeding is binding on the taxpayer as to
his property interests irrespective of the decision of the federal
court for federal tax purposes.3 7  If the federal court disre-
gards the state determination and clothes the taxpayer with a
greater property interest, he may be taxed for a property interest
he does not possess. 33 Such inconsistent results between state
and federal courts with respect to state law are likely to impair
local policies and destroy uniformity in local law. This fear is
particularly relevant to the area of federal taxation, because of
its far-reaching impact.39 It is unlikely that the Court antici-
pated such a result in defining the method of determining state
law for diversity purposes.4"
The dissenting Justices advocated the retention of the col-
lusive-noncollusive test,41 defined by the adversary nature of
the proceedings, as an adequate means of protecting the respec-
tive interests of the parties.42 Accordingly, the federal interest
35. The dissent, if accepted, would eliminate the fundamental
conflict between the circuits over the importance of adversariness in
defining collusion.
36. Cf. Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Tax Determination,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1959).
37. In both Freuler and Blair this fact was deemed to be ma-
terial. See note 25 supra.
38. For example, the state court could find that a widow had no
interest in a trust created by her husband's will, the interest passing
directly to the children, and the federal court making an independent
determination could find that the widow had a special power of ap-
pointment which was taxable.
39. See Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate
Rules of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1084, 1087 (1964). The problem is
illustrative of an inherent dilemma of federalism: the desire and need
for uniform application of national laws, and the often conflicting inter-
ests of legitimate local policies whose existence the system protects.
See authorities cited note 13 supra.
40. King v. United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
41. 387 U.S. 456, 470; see Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d
Cir. 1955).
42. Justice Harlan sees the state interests as: uniform applica-
tion of state law, protection of the states' constitutionally defined areas
of discretion, and recognition of the superior ability of state judges to
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
would be adequately protected by requiring the state proceeding
to be genuinely adversary, thus insuring an accurate declara-
tion of state law. The solution would afford a greater recogni-
tion to the legitimate interests of the taxpayer and state peculiar
to the problem, and reconcile these interests with that of the
federal fisc.
Although the test is a formal one, which may not be respon-
sive to a particular fact situation,43 there is a rational connection
between the adversary character of a proceeding and the correct-
ness of the decision. Adversariness is a fundamental charac-
teristic of our legal system, and is presumed to insure a fair and
accurate determination of law and fact.44 Furthermore, there is
support for the proposition that the adversary test is capable
of practical application.45 It is true that the test would require
an ad hoc application of the collusive-noncollusive test thus per-
haps introducing uncertainty. However, the redefinition of the
test in terms of an adversary requirement would eliminate the
kind of uncertainty that existed prior to the instant case.
The Court's analysis of the problem does provide an easily
administered test which goes to the substance of the problem.
However, in reaching its decision the Court ignored a substan-
tial body of authority and relied on construction of a statute
whose relevance to the broad issue of the effect of state trial
court decisions is questionable. Furthermore, while the appli-
cation of diversity principles may be appropriate, significant dis-
tinctions between that area of the law and the determination of
property interests for federal tax purposes are left unexplained
by the Court. The adversary requirement, advocated by the dis-
sent and a majority of the federal courts, is surely more re-
sponsive to the demands of both the taxpayer and the state
while protective of the federal fisc, despite its difficulty of defini-
tion and application.
declare state law. The federal interest, according to Harlan, is solely
the fair administration of federal revenue statutes. 387 U.S. at 477-78.
43. See, e.g., Estate of Isaac Darlingiton, 36 T.C. 599 (1961) (ad-
versariness impossible).
44. 44A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958).
45. As evidenced by previous cases in which the courts have used
the adversary test to evaluate the state proceeding. See notes 20 & 23
supra. Also the fact that the Commissioner advocated the adversary
test indicates that test is not completely impractical. See note 34 supra.
[Vol. 52:776
